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TORTS-PUNITIVE DAMAGES ARE NOT RECOVERABLE
IN A NEGLIGENCE ACTION AGAINST AN INTOXICATED
DRIVER ABSENT A SHOWING OF ACTUAL MALICE.
Komornik v. Sparks, 331 Md. 720, 629 A.2d 721 (1993).
I. INTRODUCTION
Drunk driving, a grave social problem with serious legal conse-
quences, is a severe safety risk for both the drunk driver and the
potential victims. Every year in Maryland, 10,000 injuries and deaths
occur as a result of drunk driving accidents,' and thousands of
Maryland drivers are arrested for alcohol-related driving offenses.
2
One method that has been used to deter and to punish drunk driving
has been to allow victims of drunk driving to recover punitive
damages from drunk drivers.'
In Maryland, the amount of a punitive damage award is within
the jury's discretion 4 and is usually very high.' Furthermore, defen-
dants who are liable for punitive damages in Maryland are forced
1. Ann E. Singleton, Initiatives to Combat Drunk Driving, MD. BAR J., May/
June 1990 at 17. In America, fifty percent of all fatal car accidents are alcohol-
related. Brief of Amicus Curie Maryland Trial Lawyers' Association at 2,
Komornik v. Sparks, 331 Md. 720, 629 A.2d 721 (1993) (No. 91-350) (citing
Colligan v. Fera, 349 N.Y.S.2d 306, 310 (1973)). In Maryland, the figure
increases to ninety percent. Christopher W. Nicholson, Maryland's Drunk
Driving Laws: An Overview, 11 U. BART. L. REV. 357, 357 (1982). As an
unfortunate example, consider Marylander Jerome Brown. Brown had been
driving without a license for two years before he was involved in an accident
which killed both his girlfriend and his 14-year-old daughter. Marguerite
Michaels, Unlicensed to Kill, TIME, June 13, 1994, at 54. Brown was allegedly
drunk at the time of the accident. Id.
2. See Singleton, supra note 1, at 17 (stating that 33,000 people were arrested for
alcohol-related driving offenses in Maryland during 1988 and 1989).
3. There are two general categories of damages, compensatory and pimitive.
Compensatory damages compensate the plaintiff for what he has actually lost-
for example, medical bills, lost wages, and pain and suffering. W. PAGE
KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 9 (5th
ed. 1984). Punitive damages, however, serve to punish the defendant and to
deter others from engaging in similar conduct. Id.; see infra note 8. Punitive
damages may also be called "exemplary, vindictive, penal, . . . aggravated, or
retributory." 1 LINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNrrrvE DAM-
AGES § 1.3(H) (2d ed. 1989).
4. SCHLUETER & REDDEN, supra note 3, § 2.2(A)(2).
5. See 2 J. GHIRDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNrrrVE DA AGEs LAW AND PRACTICE §
21.01, at 2 (1985).
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to pay the award from their own pockets because punitive damages
are generally uninsurable and non-dischargeable in bankruptcy. 6 Thus,
the heavy financial burden associated with punitive damages achieves
the dual purposes of punishment and deterrence.
The imposition of punitive damages also benefits the victim. For
example, victims must often pay attorney's fees and litigation costs
in order to recover damages that merely cover the cost of their
injuries, lost wages, and pain and suffering. 7 Thus, litigation expenses
may be recovered only indirectly, through a punitive damage award.'
However, on August 26, 1993, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
decided, in Komornik v. Sparks,9 that punitive damages were not
recoverable in a negligence action against an intoxicated driver absent
a showing of actual malice.'0 Komornik is of extreme importance
both to the victims of drunk drivers and to the Maryland community
because the decision has virtually eliminated punitive damages in
drunk driving cases.
6. See William C. Cooper, Punitive Damages and the Drunken Driver, 8 PEPP.
L. REV. 117, 129 (1980) ("[Plunitive damages probably serve as a greater
deterrent because they can not [sic] be absolved through bankruptcy, and in
many states are uninsurable."); see also MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-15-317 (1993)
("Insurance coverage does not extend to punitive or exemplary damages unless
expressly included by the contract of insurance."); Allen v. Simmons, 533 A.2d
541, 543-44 (R.I. 1987) (automobile insurer is not obligated to provide insurance
coverage for punitive damages).
7. The general rule is that attorney's fees are not recoverable in the absence of
a statute that provides for such recovery. SCHILUETER & REDDEN, supra note
3, § 2.2(B)(1), at 29.
8. Id. Punitive damages are often viewed as a way to compensate plaintiffs for
"elements of damage which are not legally compensable," such as wounded
dignity or attorney's fees. KEETON, supra note 3, § 2, at 9. Furthermore,
punitive damages supplement existing laws when criminal punishment is merely
a nominal fine or when punishment is an administrative sanction. SCHLUETER
& REDDEN, supra note 3, § 1.3(G). Punitive damages also vindicate society
and the victim. When the plaintiff cannot possibly be made whole by compen-
satory damages, punitive damages often fulfill the need for retribution. See id.
§ 1.3(G); Gregory A. Williams, Note, Tuttle v. Raymond: An Excessive
Restriction Upon Punitive Damage Awards in Motor Vehicle Tort Cases
Involving Reckless Conduct, 48 Omo ST. L.J. 551, 558 (1987) ("The use of
punitive damages to supplement . . . the criminal law may be entirely justified
when one considers the reprehensibility of much conduct that is not effectively
regulated by the criminal law."). Nevertheless, compensating the victim is
merely a consequence, and not an objective, in awarding punitive damages.
The ultimate objective in awarding punitive damages is to punish the defendant.
See supra note 3 and accompanying text. The focus, therefore, is on the
defendant's undesirable conduct and not on the individual plaintiff's financial
predicament.
9. 331 Md. 720, 629 A.2d 721 (1993).
10. See id. at 728-31, 629 A.2d at 725-26.
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Donna Komornik was injured three days before the 1989 Christ-
mas holiday in a four-car collision caused by a drunk driver, Gregory
Sparks." On the day of the accident, Sparks left work early, went
to a local lounge, ate lunch, and drank beer. 2 Sparks then went to
another bar, where he drank an unknown amount of whiskey. 3
Later that day, Sparks returned home. He wanted to go
Christmas shopping, but he did not have a car. 4 Without permission,
Sparks took the keys to his sister's pick-up truck and went for a
drive." He drove around for about one hour and became lost.
6
Sparks eventually found himself on Merritt Boulevard, approaching
a line of cars stopped at a red light. 7 He attempted to stop but
depressed the clutch rather than the brake and consequently caused
the collision that injured Donna Komornik.18
Sparks was found to have a blood-alcohol content of 0.19, which
is almost twice the level required to prove legal intoxication. 9 Sparks
was ultimately convicted of driving while intoxicated. 20 Sparks's
driving record also reflected other alcohol-related driving offenses.
2'
11. Id. at 721, 629 A.2d at 721.
12. Id. at 723, 629 A.2d at 722. Sparks could not recall the amount of beer he
had consumed. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. A friend had driven Sparks from bar to bar. Joint Record Extract at E-
13 to E-14, Komornik v. Sparks, 331 Md. 720, 629 A.2d 721 (1993).
15. Komornik, 331 Md. at 723, 629 A.2d at 722.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. Komornik's vehicle was struck in the rear by the car that was struck by
Sparks. Id. at 721, 629 A.2d at 721. The impact caused her vehicle to strike
the car in front of her's. Id.
19. Id. at 723, 629 A.2d at 722. A blood alcohol level of 0.10 or more is prima
facie evidence of driving while intoxicated. MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD.
PROC. § 10-307(e) (1995). A blood alcohol level of 0.07 or more is prima facie
evidence of driving while under the influence of alcohol. Id. § 10-307(d).
20. Komornik, 331 Md. at 723, 629 A.2d at 722; see MD. CODE ANN., CTs. &
JUD. PROC. § 10-307(d). Driving while intoxicated is a violation of MD. CODE
ANN., TRLANSP. § 21-902(a) (1992). Section 21-902(a) states that "[a] person
may not drive or attempt to drive any vehicle while intoxicated." Id. § 21-
902(a). The maximum punishment for a violation of subsection (a) is a fine
of not more than $1,000 and/or imprisonment for not more than one year for
a first offense, and a fine of not more than $2,000 and/or imprisonment for
not more than two years for a second offense. Id. § 27-101(k)(1). Sparks was
sentenced to only 15 days in jail and a mere $200 fine. Komornik, 331 Md.
at 723 n.4, 629 A.2d at 722 n.4.
21. Just six weeks prior to the car accident in the case sub judice, Sparks's license
was suspended because he refused to submit to a breathalyzer test. Komornik,
331 Md. at 724, 629 A.2d at 723. Sparks's record also showed that he had
received a probation before judgment in May of 1982 for driving under the
influence of alcohol and that he had been convicted in December of 1984 for
driving while intoxicated. Id. at 723-24, 629 A.2d at 722-23. As a result of the
19951
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Donna Komornik brought a civil negligence suit against Sparks
in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County. 22 Although Komornik
was awarded compensatory damages for her hospital bills and for
pain and suffering, the trial judge ruled that punitive damages could
not be recovered.23 The judge reached this decision by applying the
standard set forth in Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia.24 Komornik
appealed, arguing that "Itihe trial court erred in concluding that the
decision of the Court of Appeals in Zenobia require[d] proof of
intent to injure, evil motive, or ill will in order to recover punitive
damages in a tort action against an intoxicated driver." ' 25 The Mary-
land court of appeals granted certiorari prior to the court of special
appeals's review and affirmed the circuit court's ruling, holding that
punitive damages were not recoverable against an intoxicated driver
absent a showing of actual malice.
26
II. BACKGROUND
Maryland's history regarding its treatment of punitive damages
in automobile tort cases can be grouped into three distinct phases.
Phase I covers the time period between 1944 and 1972. Phase II
covers the period of time between 1972 and 1993. Phase III began
in 1993 and continues today. During the earliest period, Maryland
followed the standard set forth in Davis v. Gordon,27 which was the
first Maryland case to address the issue of punitive damages in an
automobile tort case.
In Davis, the administrator of the victim's estate brought an
action against the driver to recover damages sustained by the victim
as a result of a fatal automobile accident. 28 The Maryland court of
appeals addressed for the first time whether a jury instruction on
the imposition of punitive damages was proper in an automobile tort
case where there was no evidence of the defendant's motive or intent
to injure. 29 The trial court allowed the jury to be instructed on the
December 1984 conviction, Sparks's drivers license was restricted for three
years and twelve points were assessed against it. Id.
22. Appellant's Brief at 1, Komornik v. Sparks, 331 Md. 720, 629 A.2d 721 (1993)
(No. 91-350); see Komornik, 331 Md. at 722, 629 A.2d at 722.
23. Komornik, 331 Md. at 721-22, 629 A.2d at 721-22.
24. 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992).. See infra notes 77-92 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the Zenobia standard.
25. Komornik, 331 Md. at 722, 629 A.2d at 722.
26. Actual malice is defined in Maryland as "evil motive, intent to injure, ill will,
or fraud." Zenobia, 325 Md. at 460 n.20, 601 A.2d at 652 n.20.
27. 183 Md. 129, 36 A.2d 699 (1944).
28. Id. at 130, 36 A.2d at 699.
29. A preliminary issue on appeal was whether evidence of the defendant's traffic
violation was admissible. Id. at 132, 36 A.2d at 700. The court held that the
evidence was not admissible. Id.
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imposition of punitive damages, but the court of appeals reversed
and remanded.30
The Davis court was reluctant to hold that punitive damages
were recoverable in an automobile tort case under any circum-
stances.' According to the court, criminal penalties were a better
means of deterrence than were punitive damages because criminal
penalties could be applied regardless of whether injury occurred.
Punitive damages, on the other hand, could only be applied if the
wrongdoer's conduct resulted in injury to another person.12 Never-
theless, the court held that punitive damages were recoverable in a
negligence action only if the plaintiff could show "an element of
fraud, or malice, or evil intent, or oppression entering into and
forming part of the wrongful act."' 3 In other words, a plaintiff had
to show by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant had
acted with actual malice in order to recover punitive damages.
34
Under Davis, a victim incurring serious bodily injury or pecu-
niary loss could not be assured of recovering punitive damages. 5
Cases involving humiliation, injured feelings, or damage to a plain-
tiff's reputation would more likely contain the required elements of
motive, malice, and evil intent than would a case involving a drunk
driver.
36
The Maryland court of appeals further refined the Davis standard
for recovering punitive damages in Conklin v. Schillinger.3" In Conk-
lin, the defendant struck the plaintiff's car head-on while traveling
at night, on the left side of the road, without lights."8 The plaintiff
30. Id. at 134-35, 36 A.2d at 701.
31. See id. at 133-34, 36 A.2d at 700-01.
32. The Davis court stated:
We have many rules of the road, all designed and intended to promote
the public safety. They have severe penalties for their violation whether
there is an accident or not. If all drivers and all pedestrians observed
these rules there would not be any accidents. The rules of the road
are far more effective than any inflammatory verdicts in making our
streets and highways safe for travel. The fear of arrest is more of a
deterrent than a verdict in a civil case for damages.
Id. at 133, 36 A.2d at 701.
33. Id.
34. The Davis standard, "fraud, or malice, or evil intent, or oppression entering
into and forming part of the wrongful act," is very similar to the actual malice
standard defined in Zenobia, which is "evil motive, intent to injure, ill will,
or fraud." Compare Davis, 183 Md. at 133, 36 A.2d at 701, with Owens-
Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 460 n.20, 601 A.2d 633, 652 n.20
(1992).
35. See Davis, 183 Md. at 134, 36 A.2d at 701.
36. See id.
37. 255 Md. 50, 257 A.2d 187 (1969).
38. Id. at 54-55, 257 A.2d at 190.
1995]
Baltimore Law Review [Vol. 24
was knocked unconscious and his wife was thrown through the
windshield of their car.39
The trial court refused to uphold the jury's punitive damage
award, claiming that Davis v. Gordon precluded the imposition of
punitive damages. 40 The plaintiffs appealed, arguing that punitive
damages should be available when the defendant causes injury by
his intentional disregard for the safety of others.
41
Although the Conklin court recognized the inherent difficulty in
the actual malice standard set forth in Davis, the court declined to
clarify the standard .42 The Conklin court acknowledged that proving
malice would be extremely difficult for a plaintiff who was injured
by a negligent driver when there was no proof of actual intent to
harm 3.4  The court also ackowledged that a standard that was the
legal equivalent of malice, such as wanton or reckless disregard,
might be easier for a plaintiff to prove." Nevertheless, the court
39. Id. at 55, 257 A.2d at 190.
40. Id. at 70, 257 A.2d at 197.
41. Id. at 71, 257 A.2d at 198. The Conklins also argued that the trial court had
no power to grant a new trial on the ground of excessive damages because
granting a new trial violated their constitutional right to a trial by jury under
the Maryland Constitution. Id. at 58, 257 A.2d at 191. The court of appeals
held that the power to grant a new trial on the ground of excessive verdicts
was constitutional for four reasons. First, English decisions handed down prior
to the adoption of the Maryland Constitution in 1776 indicated that this
particular power could be exercised. Id. at 58-64, 257 A.2d at 191-94. Second,
the Maryland practice of granting a new trial solely upon the ground of an
excessive verdict was well established. Id. at 64-66, 257 A.2d at 194-95. Third,
a majority of states grant their higher courts the power to review excessive
verdicts. Id. at 68, 257 A.2d at 196. Finally, federal courts have the authority
to grant new trials solely on the ground of excessive verdicts. Id. at 66-68, 257
A.2d at 195-96. The Conklin court also relied heavily on Judge Medina's
opinion in Dagnello v. Long Island R.R., 289 F.2d 797 (2d Cir. 1961).
Whether the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution prohibits
a new trial solely on the basis of an excessive verdict is an issue that the
Supreme Court has not addressed. The Seventh Amendment provides that "no
fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law." U.S. CoNsT. amend.
VII; see also Jonathan Kagan, Toward a Uniform Application of Punishment:
Using the Federal Sentencing Guidelines as a Model for Punitive Damage
Reform, 40 UCLA L. REv. 753, 768-69 (1993) (stating that if a new trial
cannot be constitutionally granted, statutory caps on liability may be called
into question).
42. Conklin, 255 Md. at 71, 257 A.2d at 198.
43. Id.
44. The Conklin court stated:
The difficulty in the Maryland cases arises in regard to factual
situations in which there is no evidence of actual intent to injure or
of actual malice toward the injured person, but in which the defen-
dant's conduct is of such an extraordinary character as possibly to be
Komornik v. Sparks
declined to change the Davis rule, stating that the issue was not
properly before the court.
45
Phase II of Maryland's treatment of punitive damages in auto-
mobile tort cases began in 1972, with the holding of Smith v. Gray
Concrete Pipe Company.46 The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia certified to the Court of Appeals of
Maryland the question of whether punitive damages should be re-
coverable in an automobile accident case where the defendant was
merely reckless and not malicious. 47 This question gave the court of
appeals yet another opportunity to reformulate the standard set forth
in Davis.
Smith involved an action against Gray Concrete Pipe Company,
brought by the administrator and parents of a deceased victim, for
damages sustained by the decedent as a result of an automobile
accident caused by the defendant's employee. 4 The Maryland high
court began its analysis by citing those Maryland cases that allowed
punitive damages in other areas of tort law. 49 The court recognized
that allowing punitive damages in automobile tort cases was a growing
trend in a number of jurisdictions and was regarded as the majority
approach.50
the legal equivalent of such actual intent or actual malice, sometimes
described as "wanton,' ''reckless disregard of the rights of others,"
and the like. We rather agree that in this latter type of situation, the
language of some of the Maryland cases needs further interpretation
and possible reconsideration to reach a more clear cut rule ....
Id. (emphasis in original).
45. Id.
46. 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972).
47. Id. at 152, 297 A.2d at 723. Prior to bringing the action in federal court, the
plaintiffs had filed the same cause of action in the Circuit Court for Mont-
gomery County. Id. at 155, 297 A.2d at 725. The case was removed to the
Circuit Court for Prince George's County, after a dispute over venue. Id.
Later, the plaintiffs took a voluntary nonsuit in the Circuit Court for Prince
George's County. Id. at 156, 297 A.2d at 726. The case was certified to the
court of appeals pursuant to the Uniform Certification of Questions of Law
Act. MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JuD. PROC. §§ 12-601 to -609 (1995).
48. Smith, 267 Md. at 151-53, 297 A.2d at 723-24.
49. Id. at 162, 297 A.2d at 728-29. The court cited the following cases: Summit
Loans, Inc. v. Pecola, 265 Md. 43, 288 A.2d 114 (1972) (invasion of privacy);
Drug Fair v. Smith, 263 Md. 341, 283 A.2d 392 (1971) (assault and battery,
false imprisonment and malicious prosecution); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v.
Paul, 256 Md. 643, 261 A.2d 731 (1970) (assault and battery, slander and false
imprisonment); Vancherie v. Siperly, 243 Md. 366, 221 A.2d 356 (1966) (assault
and battery); Fennell v. G.A.C. Finance Corp., 242 Md. 209, 218 A.2d 492
(1966) (libel); McClung-Logan v. Thomas, 266 Md. 136, 172 A.2d 494 (1961)
(trover and conversion); Nichols v. Meyer, 139 Md. 450, 115 A. 786 (1921)
(trespass). Smith, 267 Md. at 162, 297 A.2d at 728-29.
50. Smith, 267 Md. at 162-65, 297 A.2d at 729-30.
19951
Baltimore Law Review
The Smith court, drawing upon the dicta in Conklin v. Schillin-
ger," held that a wanton or reckless disregard for human life in the
operation of a motor vehicle was the legal equivalent of malice.52
According to the court, if wanton or reckless disregard for human
life was a sufficient standard by which to determine criminal guilt,
then the standard was also sufficient to determine the requisite state
of mind for civil liability. 3 After Smith, proof of actual malice, evil
intent, or oppression was not required in order for a plaintiff to be
awarded punitive damages.14 Instead, a plaintiff could prove implied
malice by showing that the defendant acted with the legal equivalent
of actual malice. 55
To limit the effect of the new, implied malice standard, the
Smith court mandated a higher burden of pleading . 6 Plaintiffs'
complaints were required to provide greater specificity and more
detailed factual accounts of defendants' negligent conduct.57 "[B]ald
or conclusory allegations of 'wanton or reckless disregard for human
life"' would not withstand a motion to dismiss the complaint.5 8
The court of appeals applied the new Smith rule in Nast v.
Lockett5 9 Nast arose from an automobile accident involving three
cars. 6° One car was driven by the plaintiff, Edward Nast, the second
car was driven by the defendant, Lois Lockett, and the third car was
51. 255 Md. 50, 257 A.2d 187 (1969).
52. Smith, 267 Md. at 168, 297 A.2d at 731-32. Interestingly, the court stated that
the standard for malice, "wanton or reckless disregard for human life," was
a sufficient standard for imposing civil liability because it was regarded as
adequately stringent for imposing criminal penalties. Id. at 168, 297 A.2d at
732.
53. Id. at 168, 297 A.2d at 731-32. The Smith court used the requisite state of
mind for manslaughter by automobile in formulating a standard for the
allowance of punitive damages in automobile tort cases. The manslaughter by
automobile statute provides, in pertinent part, that "[elvery person causing the
death of another as the result of the driving . . .of an automobile . . .in a
grossly negligent manner, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor to be known as
'manslaughter by automobile . . . "' MD. ANN. CODE art. 27, § 388 (1957,
1992 Repl. Vol.) (emphasis added). Gross negligence was defined as "a wanton
or reckless disregard for human life." Smith, 267 Md. at 167, 297 A.2d at
731 (citing Romanesk v. Rose, 248 Md. 425, 237 A.2d 12 (1968); Wasileski v.
State, 241 Md. 323, 216 A.2d 551 (1966); Johnson v. State, 213 Md. 527, 132
A.2d 853 (1957)).
54. See Smith, 267 Md. at 165-68, 297 A.2d at 730-32.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 168, 297 A.2d at 732.
57. Id.
58. Id. The Smith court wanted to avoid a standard that was so flexible that it
would become "virtually unlimited in its application." Id. at 166, 297 A.2d at
731.
59. 312 Md. 343, 539 A.2d 1113 (1988).
60. Id. at 347, 539 A.2d at 1115.
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driven by Charles Houck.6 Both Lockett and Houck had been
drinking prior to the accident.
62
The trial judge decided that, as a matter of law, the conduct of
Lockett and Houck, even considering their intoxication, did not
amount to a wanton or reckless disregard for human life. 63 The jury
was, therefore, not instructed on the issue of punitive damages.
4
The court of appeals agreed with the trial judge that Lockett's
conduct, as a matter of law, could not support an award for punitive
damages. 65 The court of appeals disagreed, however, as to Houck's
61. Id.
62. Id. at 352, 355-56, 539 A.2d at 1118-20. Nast had been following Lockett's
car when Lockett attempted to make a U-turn. Id. at 347, 539 A.2d at 1115.
Lockett was unable to complete the turn and came to a stop. Id. She began
to back up so that she could complete the turn when Houck, who was traveling
in the opposite direction, ran into her. Id. Houck did not slow his speed or
deviate from his course. Id. Houck's car ricocheted off of Lockett's car and
struck the plaintiff's car. Id. at 348, 539 A.2d at 1115.
63. Id. at 359, 539 A.2d at 1121.
64. Id. at 348, 539 A.2d at 1115-16.
65. Id. at 367, 539 A.2d at 1125. A preliminary question was whether evidence of
the defendants' alcohol impairment was legally sufficient to sustain a finding
that the defendants were "intoxicated" by law. Id. at 355-59, 539 A.2d at
1119-21. In deciding this issue, the court examined the evidence of intoxication
against each defendant. Id. Lockett's blood alcohol content was approximately
0.11 to 0.12. Id. at 356, 539 A.2d at 1119. There was no other evidence of
drunkenness. Id.
In April of 1988, when Nast was decided, the legislature had not defined
either "intoxication" or "under the influence of alcohol." Id. at 355 n.5, 539
A.2d at 1119 n.5. Under MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 10-307, blood
alcohol content can serve as prima facie evidence of intoxication or impairment.
MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PROC. § 10-307 (1995). In July of 1988, the
legislature decreased the blood alcohol levels necessary to prove prima facie
intoxication or impairment from 0.13 to 0.10 and from 0.08 to 0.07, respec-
tively. Compare MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-307 (1987) (amended
1988) with MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-307 (Supp. 1990).
Houck's blood alcohol content could not be obtained. Nast, 312 Md. at 356-
57, 539 A.2d at 1120. An investigating police officer, however, testified that
Houck was swaying and staggering, that his breath smelled of alcohol, that
his clothes were "disarranged," and that he was "mush mouthed." Id. at 357,
539 A.2d at 1120. A paramedic testified that Houck appeared to be intoxicated
because he was uncooperative, was combative, could not converse, smelled of
alcohol, had bloodshot eyes, and because all he could do was moan. Id. The
medical doctor who treated Houck at the hospital also testified that Houck
appeared to be intoxicated. Id. at 358, 539 A.2d at 1120.
The court of appeals held that Houck's conduct, odor, and appearance was
sufficient evidence to sustain a finding that Houck was "intoxicated." Id. at
359, 539 A.2d at 1121. On the other hand, Lockett's blood alcohol content
was insufficient to sustain a finding that she was "intoxicated," but was
sufficient to sustain a finding that she was "under the influence of alcohol."
Id. at 356, 539 A.2d at 1120.
19951
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conduct. 66 The Nast court held that Houck's conduct was legally
sufficient to support an award for punitive damages and, therefore,
that the jury should have been instructed on the issue of punitive
damages against Houck. 67
The court held that a sliding scale was to be used in automobile
tort cases to determine whether the driver's conduct amounted to
wanton or reckless disregard for human life.6 The requisite state of
mind, wanton and reckless, could be inferred from two separate sets
of circumstances. 69 First, a wanton or reckless state of mind could
be inferred from the manner in which the defendant operated his
vehicle. 70 Second, a wanton or reckless state of mind could be inferred
from the defendant's degree of intoxication. 71 The Nast sliding scale
represented the Maryland court of appeals's attempt to formulate a
standard that could accommodate all auto-tort cases, including drunk
driving cases and cases involving gross negligence or other culpable
conduct.
The Nast court applied the sliding scale test to the facts in Nast
and held that, although Houck was negligent in not slowing down
or altering his course, his negligence alone was not enough to support
an award for punitive damages. 72 Houck's negligence, coupled with
his degree of intoxication, however, was sufficient to raise his actions
to the level of wanton and reckless required for a punitive damage
award. 73 In contrast, Lockett's degree of impairment, which had not
reached the level of legal intoxication, was insufficient to elevate her
simple negligence to the level of wanton and reckless conduct.
74
The implied malice standard, formulated in Smith and later
applied in Nast, was originally limited to torts involving the operation
of automobiles .7 It was subsequently expanded and applied to all
66. Id. at 366, 539 A.2d at 1124.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 362, 539 A.2d at 1122.
69. Id. at 362, 539 A.2d at 1122-23.
70. Id. at 362, 539 A.2d at 1123. The Nast court stated: "Outrageously dangerous
driving permits an inference that the driver does not care whether he kills or
severely injures someone else." Id.
71. See id. at 362-63, 539 A.2d at 1123. In addressing the second set of circum-
stances from which a wanton and reckless state of mind could be inferred, the
court stated that one could "infer a reckless or wanton disregard for human
life from the combined acts of voluntarily drinking until intoxicated and then
operating a potentially dangerous instrumentality such as an automobile." Id.
72. Id. at 365-66, 539 A.2d at 1124.
73. Id. at 366, 539 A.2d at 1124 (emphasis added).
74. Id. at 366-67, 539 A.2d at 1124-25.
75. See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 457, 601 A.2d 633, 651
(1992).
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other non-intentional tort cases7 6 until the court of appeals decided
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia,77 in 1992. Zenobia once again changed
the standard that was to be used in awarding punitive damages in
non-intentional tort actions.
78
The plaintiffs, Louis L. Dickerson and William L. Zenobia, sued
several asbestos manufacturers, suppliers and installers, including
Owens-Illinois, Inc., under a products liability theory, for injuries
resulting from exposure to asbestos. 79 The Court of Appeals of
Maryland granted certiorari to consider, inter alia, the standard that
governed the allowance of punitive damages in non-intentional tort
cases .0
In determining the appropriate standard to use in awarding
punitive damages in non-intentional tort cases, the court of appeals
explored Smith and its progeny, the line of cases applying the implied
malice standard .8 The Zenobia court expressly overruled Smith and
its progeny and expressed concern for the proliferation of punitive
damage claims and the increase in criticism of such damages as a
means of recovery.8 2 The court implied that Smith's holding was
hasty and unreasoned, 3 and pointed out that the Smith court did
not analyze how the implied malice standard would promote the
objectives of punitive damages. 4 The court noted that the "arbitrary
76. Id.; see Exxon Corp. v. Yarema, 69 Md. App. 124, 516 A.2d 990 (1986)
(applying implied malice standard to interference with property rights), cert.
denied, 309 Md. 47, 522 A.2d 392 (1987); Medina v. Meilhammer, 62 Md.
App. 239, 489 A.2d 35 (applying implied malice standard to personal injury
action arising out of injuries sustained by a minor in an apartment complex),
cert. denied, 303 Md. 683, 496 A.2d 683 (1985); American Laundry Mach. v.
Horan, 45 Md. App. 97, 412 A.2d 407 (1980) (applying implied malice standard
to products liability case); see also Liscombe v. Potomac Edison Co., 303 Md.
619, 637, 495 A.2d 838, 847 (1985) (assuming, without deciding, that the Smith
holding was applicable to non-intentional torts not involving the operation of
automobiles).
77. 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992).
78. For a discussion of the Zenobia standard, see infra notes 79-92 and accom-
panying text.
79. Id. at 428, 601 A.2d at 636.
80. Id. at 427-28, 601 A.2d at 636.
81. Id. at 456-58, 601 A.2d at 650-51. Under the implied malice test, malice was
equated with wanton and reckless behavior. Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co.,
267 Md. 149, 168, 297 A.2d 721, 731 (1972). Later, gross negligence was
equated with malice under the implied malice test. See Nast v. Lockett, 312
Md. 343, 365-66, 539 A.2d 1113, 1124 (1988).
82. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 450-51, 601 A.2d at 647-48.
83. Id. at 456, 601 A.2d at 650-51.
84. The Zenobia court stated:
The Smith opinion did not attempt to analyze how this newly estab-
lished "gross negligence" standard would promote the objectives of
punitive damages.
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and inconsistent application of the standard for awarding punitive
damages frustrate[d] the dual purposes of punishment and deter-
rence." 85 According to the court, the implied malice test set forth in
Smith actually undermined the deterrent effect of punitive damages
because potential defendants were not provided with enough guidance
upon which to predict the type of behavior that would lead to the
imposition of punitive damages.8 6 The Zenobia court held that pu-
nitive damages could only be awarded in a non-intentional tort action
if the defendant's conduct was characterized by actual malice, defined
as "evil motive, intent to injure, ill will, or fraud .... -"7 After
Zenobia, a plaintiff would have to prove that a defendant acted with
actual malice in order to recover punitive damages.8
Despite the Smith Court's limitation of the implied malice standard
to torts involving the operation of motor vehicles, the standard has
been freely applied to other non-intentional torts.
The implied malice test adopted in Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe
Co. has been overbroad in its application and has resulted in incon-
sistent jury verdicts involving similar facts. It provides little guidance
for individuals and companies to enable them to predict behavior that
will either trigger or avoid punitive damages liability, and it undermines
the deterrent effect of these awards.
Id. at 456-59, 601 A.2d at 650-52 (citations and footnote omitted).
85. Id. at 458-59, 601 A.2d at 652. The Zenobia court stated: "The law of punitive
damages is characterized by a high degree of uncertainty that stems from the
use of a multiplicity of vague, overlapping terms .... Accordingly, there is
little reason to believe that only deserving defendants are punished, or that
fair notice of punishable conduct is provided." Id. at 459, 601 A.2d at 652
(quoting D. Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56
S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 52-53 (1982)).
86. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 459, 601 A.2d at 652. The Zenobia court noted that
"[t]he gross negligence standard ha[d] led to inconsistent results and frustration
of the purposes of punitive damages in non-intentional tort cases." Id. at 456,
601 A.2d at 651.
87. Id. at 460, 601 A.2d at 652.
88. The Zenobia court stated in a footnote:
We recognize that the term "actual malice" has meant different things
in the law, that its popular connotation may not always be the same
as its legal meaning, and that its use has been criticized. Nevertheless,
we simply use the term in this opinion as a shorthand method of
referring to conduct characterized by evil motive, intent to injure, ill
will, or fraud. In instructing juries with respect to punitive damages,
however, it would be preferable for trial judges not to use the term
"actual malice."
Id. at 460 n.20, 601 A.2d at 653 n.20 (citations omitted).
The court of appeals realized, however, that the new actual malice standard
would be very difficult, if not impossible, to apply in products liability cases.
See id. at 460, 601 A.2d at 653. The court, therefore, formulated a standard
equivalent to the actual malice standard that would be used only in products
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In addition to requiring the plaintiff to demonstrate the defen-
dant's state of mind, the court increased the burden of proof required
to recover punitive damages in a non-intentional tort action.8 9 The
clear and convincing standard 9° was chosen over the preponderance
of the evidence standard, 9' the standard used prior to Zenobia,
because of the seriousness of punitive damages as a penal remedy. 92
Although Zenobia, decided in 1992, once again changed the
standard that was to be used in awarding punitive damages in
Maryland, the actual malice standard was not applied to automobile
torts until 1993, when Komornik v. Sparks93 was decided. Phase III
of Maryland's treatment of punitive damages in automobile tort
cases, therefore, began in 1993 and continues today.
The court of appeals's holding in Komornik was based on its
decision in Zenobia.94 Today, due to Zenobia and its progeny,
Maryland's position on punitive damages in automobile tort cases is
that they are only available upon a showing of actual malice. 95 The
court has come full circle and, in Phase III, has returned to its
original actual malice standard, formulated in Phase 1.96 Phase III,
however, is not only a return to Phase I. Rather, the increased
burden of proof required under Phase III means that punitive dam-
ages are now more difficult to recover than at any other time in
Maryland's history.
liability cases. Id. at 462, 601 A.2d at 653. Under the actual malice equivalent
standard, a plaintiff could recover punitive damages if he proved: "(1) actual
knowledge of the defect on the part of the defendant, and (2) the defendant's
conscious or deliberate disregard of the foreseeable harm resulting from the
defect." Id.
89. Id. at 469, 601 A.2d at 657.
90. The clear and convincing evidence standard requires that the plaintiff prove
his case with "something more than a mere preponderance of the evidence;
the proof must be 'clear and satisfactory' and be of such a character as to
appeal strongly to the conscience of the court." Id. at 466, 601 A.2d at 655-
56 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of S. Md. v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co.,
275 Md. 400, 411, 340 A.2d 275, 283 (1975)). Clear and convincing evidence
is "[tihat proof which results in reasonable certainty of the truth of the ultimate
fact in controversy." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 172 (abridged 6th ed. 1991).
"Clear and convincing proof will be shown where the truth of the facts asserted
is highly probable." Id.
91. The preponderance of the evidence standard requires a plaintiff to convince
the jury that his version of the facts is "more probable than not." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 819 (abridged 6th ed. 1991).
92. "Punitive damages are a form of punishment and can stigmatize the defendant
in much the same way as a criminal conviction." Zenobia, 325 Md. at 468,
601 A.2d at 656.
93. 331 Md. 720, 629 A.2d 721 (1993).
94. 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992).
95. See id.
96. See supra text accompanying notes 27-45.
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III. THE INSTANT CASE
In Komornik v. Sparks, defendant Sparks, who was intoxicated
at the time of the accident, admitted liability prior to trial. 97 At trial,
Sparks argued that his admission of liability coupled with Zenobia's
requirement of actual malice meant that punitive damages could not
be awarded. 98 Sparks moved to preclude, as irrelevant, any evidence
of his driving record or his intoxication.99 Plaintiff Komornik's sole
reason for proffering the evidence of Sparks's driving record and
intoxication was to recover punitive damages.100 In granting Sparks's
motion to exclude the evidence, the trial judge relied on the holding
of Zenobia,'0 which required proof of actual malice before allowing
the issue of punitive damages to go to the jury.10 2
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland reviewed Davis
v. Gordon,0 a Conklin v. Schillinger,'° Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe
Co., 105 and Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia.1 1 The court of appeals,
97. Komornik, 331 Md. at 722, 629 A.2d at 722.
98. Id.
99. Id.; Joint Record Extract at E-12, Komornik v. Sparks, 331 Md. 720, 629
A.2d 721 (1993) (No. 91-350).
100. See Kormornik, 331 Md. at 722, 629 A.2d at 722. Sparks's admission of
liability meant that the only issue for the jury was the amount of Komornik's
compensable damages, unless punitive damages were also allowable. Id. ("Based
on [Sparks's admission] and on Zenobia, Sparks moved in limine to preclude,
as irrelevant to any issue in the case, any evidence of his intoxication and of
his driving record."). By proffering evidence of Sparks's intoxication, Komor-
nik hoped to show that Sparks acted with the actual malice, evil motive, intent
to injure, or ill will necessary to support an award for punitive damages. Id.
101. 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992).
102. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 460, 601 A.2d at 652; see also Joint Record Extract at
E-12, Komornik v. Sparks, 331 Md. 720, 629 A.2d 721 (1993) (No. 91-350).
The trial judge stated:
[Sparks] has filed a motion in limine asking that [Komornik] be
precluded from offering into evidence any evidence relating to [Sparks's]
driving record and prior subsequent accidents or evidence of drinking
or intoxication and in support of that brings to the Court's attention
[Zenobia]. We have discussed this matter in chambers, and the Court
feels that in light of the admission of liability and in my understanding
of the opinion, that the evidence would not indicate actual malice as
required and, therefore, would have no probative value.
Id.
103. 183 Md. 129, 36 A.2d 699 (1944); see Komornik, 331 Md. at 728, 629 A.2d
at 725. See also supra text accompanying notes 27-36 for a discussion of Davis
v. Gordon.
104. 255 Md. 50, 257 A.2d 187 (1969); see Komornik, 331 Md. at 728, 629 A.2d
at 725. See also supra text accompanying notes 37-45 for a discussion of
Conklin v. Schillinger.
105. 267 Md. 149, 297 A.2d 721 (1972); see Komornik, 331 Md. at 728-29, 629
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like the trial court, relied on the new standard formulated for punitive
damages in non-intentional tort cases set forth in Zenobia.'0 7
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court that the evidence
was insufficient to show that Sparks had acted with actual malice. '08
According to the Maryland high court, Donna Komornik presented
no facts from which a jury could reasonably infer intent to injure
on the part of Sparks.' °9 In fact, the court stated that "Sparks's
state of mind was to the contrary of that required by Zenobia.
' ' 0
Sparks's intent was to avoid injury because at the time of the accident
he was attempting to step on the brake pedal and to prevent his
truck from colliding with another vehicle."' According to the Ko-
mornik court, if Sparks had been acting with actual malice he would
not have tried to depress the brake pedal."
2
Komornik's primary argument on appeal was that an analogy
should be drawn to the products liability standard set forth in
Zenobia.13 Acceptance of the analogy would be a necessary step to
Komornik's potential recovery of punitive damages because actual
malice would be difficult to prove in a drunk driving case.
' 4
In products liability cases, according to Zenobia, the equivalent
of actual malice could be proven by showing "a bad faith decision
by the defendant to market a product, knowing of the defect and
danger, in conscious or deliberate disregard of the threat to the safety
of the consumer.""' 5 Komornik argued that an equivalent actual
A.2d at 725. See also supra text accompanying notes 46-58 for a discussion of
Smith v. Gray Concrete Pipe Co.
106. 325 Md. 420, 601 A.2d 633 (1992); see Komornik, 325 Md. at 724-25, 729,
629 A.2d at 723, 725-26. See also supra text accompanying notes 77-92 for a
discussion of Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia.
107. Komornik, 331 Md. at 724-25, 629 A.2d at 723.
108. Id. at 725-26, 629 A.2d at 723-24.
109. Id. at 725, 629 A.2d at 724.
110. Id. The Komornik court explained:
Komornik's proffer presents no facts from which a jury would be
permitted, under Zenobia, to infer that Sparks's conduct was char-
acterized by evil motive, intent to injure, ill will,. or fraud. Indeed,
the proffer reflects that, at the time of the accident, Sparks's state of
mind was to the contrary of that required by Zenobia. His intent was
to avoid injury to those stopped ahead of him. He had not been
travelling at an excessive speed, and he was attempting to stop the
truck.
Id. at 725-26, 629 A.2d at 724.
111. Id.
112. Sparks was applying the clutch rather than the brake. Id. at 722, 629 A.2d at
721-22.
113. Id. at 726-27, 629 A.2d at 724.
114. See infra note 192 and accompanying text.
115. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 463, 601 A.2d at 654.
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malice test should be formulated for drunk driving cases." 6 Komornik
suggested the following equivalent of malice test: "[A] bad faith
decision by the Defendant to voluntarily consume excessive amounts
of alcohol, have knowledge of the danger associated with driving in
this condition and in conscious and deliberate disregard of the threat




Komornik likened intoxicated drivers to defective products."
8
She argued that the act of drunk driving was analogous to marketing
a defective product. 19 By driving while intoxicated, a drunk driver
puts all other drivers in danger.' 20 Thus, an intoxicated driver is at
least as culpable as a corporate defendant that has marketed a
defective product knowing of its propensity for harm. 121
Komornik argued that Sparks had actual knowledge of his
"defective condition" because he had been charged with driving
under the influence and driving while intoxicated on three prior
occasions; 22 the last incident had occurred just over one month prior
to the accident with Komornik and had resulted in the suspension
of his driver's license. 23 From these facts, Komornik argued, one
could infer that Sparks knew that he was unable to operate an
automobile safely while under the influence of alcohol. 24 Despite
this knowledge, Sparks spent an afternoon drinking and driving,
consciously disregarding the foreseeable harm that might result from
his behavior. 25 Komornik argued that Sparks's actions were equiv-
alent to, or worse than, the defendant's conduct in Zenobia.1
26
The court of appeals flatly rejected Komornik's argument. 27 The
high court stated that a supplier of a defective product could be
116. Komornik, 331 Md. at 726-27, 629 A.2d at 724; see also Appellant's Brief at
10-12, Komornik v. Sparks, 331 Md. 720, 629 A.2d 721 (1993) (No. 91-350)
(explaining how the Komornik facts fit into the Zenobia products liability test
for malice).
117. Appellant's Brief at 8, Komornik v. Sparks, 331 Md. 720, 629 A.2d 721 (1993)
(No. 91-350).
118. Komornik, 331 Md. at 726, 629 A.2d at 724.
119. Id. at 726-27, 629 A.2d at 724.
120. Id. at 727, 629 A.2d at 724.
121. Id.; Appellant's Brief at 12, Komornik v. Sparks, 331 Md. 720, 629 A.2d 721
(1993) (No. 91-350).
122. Appellant's Brief at 10-11, Komornik v. Sparks, 331 Md. 720, 629 A.2d 721
(1993) (No. 91-350); see also Komornik, 331 Md. at 723-24, 629 A.2d at 722-
23 (describing Sparks's driving record).
123. Komornik, 331 Md. at 724, 629 A.2d at 723. Sparks claimed he was unaware
of the suspension. Id.
124. Appellant's Brief at 11, Komornik v. Sparks, 331 Md. 720, 629 A.2d 721
(1993) (No. 91-350).
125. Komornik, 331 Md. at 723, 629 A.2d at 722.
126. Id. at 727, 629 A.2d at 724; Appellant's Brief at 12, Komornik v. Sparks, 331
Md. 720, 629 A.2d 721 (1993) (No. 91-350).
127. Komornik, 331 Md. at 727, 629 A.2d at 724. The court succinctly stated that
the analogy was "flawed." Id.
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distinguished from an intoxicated driver because suppliers of defective
products relinquish control over the products when they place the
products into the stream of commerce. 128 Sparks, on the other hand,
did not relinquish control when driving while intoxicated. 29 In fact,
the court stated, Sparks was attempting to control his truck at the
time of the accident.
30
The Komornik court concluded that the Smith implied malice
test was too broad in its application and decided to apply the Zenobia
standard to automobile accident cases.' The court reaffirmed its
Zenobia holding-that the implied malice standard "provide[d] little
guidance" for individuals and companies to predict the type of
behavior that might lead to the imposition of punitive damages.
32
Thus, the court stated, the implied malice standard undermined the
deterrent effect of punitive damages in automobile-tort cases.'33 Ac-
cordingly, the court rejected, as a matter of public policy, the idea
that punitive damages should be made available when an automobile




130. According to Maryland's high court, "Sparks had not relinquished control of
the truck; he was trying to control it." Id. (emphasis added). However,
Komornik's analogy was that Sparks, himself, was the defective product. See
id. at 726-27, 629 A.2d at 724; Appellant's Brief at 10, Komornik v. Sparks,
331 Md. 720, 629 A.2d 721 (1993) (No. 91-350). Sparks clearly did not have
control over himself. In fact, the court admitted that the truck could have
been stopped under similar circumstances by a sober driver. Komornik, 331
Md. at 727, 629 A.2d at 724-25.
131. Komornik, 331 Md. at 729, 629 A.2d at 725-26. Punitive damages could be
awarded upon a showing of reckless disregard or even gross negligence under
the implied malice standard. See also supra text accompanying notes 51-55 for
a discussion of the implied malice standard adopted by the court in Smith.
132. Komornik, 331 Md. at 729, 629 A.2d at 725-26 (quoting Owens-Illinois, Inc.
v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 459, 601 A.2d 633, 652 (1992)).
133. Id.
134. The Maryland Trial Lawyers' Association advocated the adoption of a per se
rule allowing punitive damages in drunk driving cases "where a motor vehicle
tort [wa]s committed by a driver who ha[d] drunk alcoholic beverages to
excess." Id. at 729-30, 629 A.2d at 726. See also infra note 196 and accom-
panying text for a discussion on the per se approach to drunk driving. The
Komornik court rejected a per se approach as a matter of public policy and,
in a footnote, stated:
We recognize that, across the entire band of torts of all kinds which
the Zenobia principle governs concerning the award of punitive dam-
ages, application of the principle to tortious injury caused by driving
while intoxicated is fairly debatable as a matter of social policy. We
also note that House Bill 322 of the 1993 session of the Maryland
General Assembly would have returned to a standard of "wanton or
reckless disregard for human life" in such cases, but that the bill
failed on third reading in the House for want of a constitutional
19951
Judge McAuliffe concurred with the majority's result but not
with the majority's holding.' Judge McAuliffe rejected the majori-
ty's position that only actual malice would support an award of
punitive damages.' 36 Rather, the Judge stated that punitive damages
should be recoverable if the plaintiff could show that the defendant
acted with conduct sufficient to support a conviction for second-
degree murder.
3 7
According to Judge McAuliffe, the problem with Smith and
Nast was that punitive damages could be awarded if the plaintiff
proved that the defendant acted with gross negligence. 138 In accord
with the majority, Judge McAuliffe believed the standard was over-
broad and resulted in inconsistent application. 3 9 Judge McAuliffe,
however, believed that a retreat from the gross negligence standard
did not necessarily mean that only an actual malice standard would
suffice. ,40 He advocated that the following standard be applied in all
non-intentional tort cases:
A person who is actually aware that his action involves a
clear and serious danger of substantial harm to the plaintiff
majority under Md. Const. art. III, § 28.
Id. at 730 n.6, 629 A.2d at 726 n.6. Upon a third reading, House Bill 322
failed by only four votes. House of Delegates, Journal of Proceedings, at 1714
(Mar. 19, 1992). A motion was made to reconsider the vote by which House
Bill 322 failed to receive a constitutional majority, but the motion was rejected.
Id. at 1722.
135. Komornik, 331 Md. at 731, 629 A.2d at 726 (McAuliffe, J., concurring).
136. Id. Judge McAuliffe had made the same argument in his concurring opinion
in Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 476-78, 601 A.2d 633, 660-
61 (1992) (McAuliffe, J., concurring).
137. Judge McAuliffe stated that he would adhere to the view expressed in his
concurring opinion in Zenobia regarding the appropriate state of mind of the
defendant for a punitive damages award. Komornik, 331 Md. at 731, 629 A.2d
at 726 (McAuliffe, J., concurring). In Zenobia, Judge McAuliffe advocated
the following requisite state of mind:
There is a state of mind that falls just short of an intent to injure,
but is sufficiently egregious to be treated as the legal equivalent of
an intent to injure for criminal as well as civil purposes. . . . "This
highly blameworthy state of mind is not one of mere negligence....
It is not merely one even of gross criminal negligence .... It involves
rather the deliberate perpetration of a knowingly dangerous act with
reckless and wanton unconcern and indifference as to whether anyone
is harmed or not."
Zenobia, 325 Md. at 476-77, 601 A.2d at 661 (McAuliffe, J., concurring)
(quoting, in part, DeBettencourt v. State, 48 Md. App. 522, 530, 428 A.2d
479, 484, cert. denied, 290 Md. 713 (1981)).
138. Komornik, 331 Md. at 731-32, 629 A.2d at 727 (McAuliffe, J., concurring).
139. Id. (citing Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 459-60, 601 A.2d 633
(1992)).
140. Id. at 732, 629 A.2d at 727.
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or anyone in the plaintiff's class, and who unreasonably
takes such action with flagrant indifference as to whether
anyone will be harmed or not, should be liable for punitive
damages if his conduct causes the foreseeable harm. This
type of outrageous conduct, being just short of intentional
harm, warrants such a sanction. Although the requisite
conduct and state of mind will often include gross negli-
gence, the test would not be met by a showing of gross
negligence alone.
141
Judge McAuliffe concurred with the majority's holding only because
he believed Sparks's conduct did not meet this standard. 1
4
1
Judge Chasanow also concurred with the majority's result but
wrote separately to advocate the equivalent standard for actual malice
that he had advanced in his dissenting opinion in Zenobia.143 Judge
Chasanow opined that the Zenobia court regressed, instead of pro-
gressed, when it held that all non-intentional torts would be subjected
to an actual malice standard.144 Judge Chasanow noted that even in
deciding Zenobia, the court did not apply the actual malice stan-
dard. 145 The Zenobia court had concluded that the definition of
actual malice, encompassing terms such as evil motive, ill will, and
intent to injure, was inapplicable to a products liability action. 146
Thus, the Zenobia court formulated a different standard, to be used
only in products liability cases, that was the legal equivalent of actual
malice.
47
Judge Chasanow disagreed with the Komornik majority's appli-
cation of the actual malice test to drunk driving cases because he
believed, as he did in Zenobia, that the majority was attempting to
return to the antiquated Davis standard. 148 He argued that the Davis
141. Id. (McAuliffe, J., concurring) (quoting Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325
Md. 420, 477-78, 601 A.2d 633, 661 (1992) (McAuliffe, J., concurring)).
142. Id. at 732, 629 A.2d at 727 (McAuliffe, J., concurring).
143. Id. at 732-33, 629 A.2d at 727-28 (Chasanow, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 733, 629 A.2d at 727-28 (Chasanow, J., concurring).
145. Id. See Zenobia, 325 Md. at 460 n.20, 601 A.2d at 653 n.20 for a discussion
of the products liability standard.
146. Komornik, 331 Md. at 736, 629 A.2d at 729 (Chasanow, J., concurring); see
Zenobia, 325 Md. at 460, 601 A.2d at 653.
147. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 461, 601 A.2d at 653.
148. Komornik, 331 Md. at 733, 629 A.2d at 727 (Chasanow, J., concurring). Judge
Chasanow stated:
The Court ... expressly overrule[d] several prior cases, and sug-
gest[ed] we are merely returning to the law as it was set forth in
Davis v. Gordon. It seems to me the Court is not merely reverting
back to previously superseded punitive damages law. Instead, the
Court is modifying punitive damages law in tort cases.... [Accord-
ingly, tihe "test" which the majority purports to resurrect from Davis
19951
standard was no more applicable to other non-intentional tort cases
than it was to products liability cases. 49 Judge Chasanow noted that
in deciding Zenobia and, subsequently, Komornik, the majority did
not return to the actual malice definition set forth in Davis. 15 0 Instead,
the majority modified the Davis approach. 5'
According to the majority, actual malice was characterized by
"evil motive, intent to injure, ill will, or fraud."'1 5 2 Under Davis,
however, actual malice was characterized by "fraud, or malice, or
evil intent, or oppression."'53 Judge Chasanow interpreted the ma-
jority's modification of the Davis definition as a sign that the
majority realized the shortcomings of the original Davis standard.'54
As an alternative to merely modifying the old Davis standard,
Judge Chasanow suggested the formulation of an actual malice
equivalent standard, as the Zenobia court did, that would apply to
all torts, intentional and non-intentional. 5  The standard would clearly
set forth the punishable state of awareness and give sufficient guid-
ance to judges and juries. 5 6 The improved equivalent standard would
require the plaintiff to prove that: (1) the defendant committed an
intentional act, and (2) the defendant knew that the act would cause
is inadequate in the instant case for the same reasons it was held to
be inadequate in Zenobia. Instead of looking backward for an archaic
test for "actual malice," the Court should look forward as we did in
Zenobia and formulate an improved "equivalent" test for actual
malice.
Id. at 733, 629 A.2d 727-28 (citations omitted).
149. Id. at 737, 629 A.2d at 730 (Chasanow, J., concurring).
150. Id. at 738, 629 A.2d at 730.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 724, 629 A.2d at 723 (quoting Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md.
420, 460 n.20, 601 A.2d 633, 652 n.20 (1992)).
153. Davis v. Gordon, 183 Md. 129, 133, 36 A.2d 699, 701 (1944). Another reason
that the standard applied by the majority in Komornik was not merely a return
to the Davis standard was that the burden of proof had changed after Zenobia.
See Zenobia, 325 Md. at 469, 601 A.2d at 657. Zenobia changed the burden
of proof for punitive damages in non-intentional tort cases from preponderance
of the evidence to clear and convincing proof. Id.
154. Komornik, 331 Md. at 738, 629 A.2d at 730 (Chasanow, J., concurring).
155. Id. at 736-39, 629 A.2d at 728-31. Judge Chasanow was quick to point out
that "requiring the equivalent of actual malice uniformly for punitive damages
in all tort actions would be consistent with Zenobia's holding." Id. at 735,
629 A.2d at 729. An "equivalent" standard would be in accord with Zenobia's
holding because the Zenobia court sought to formulate a standard that would
be uniformly applied and would, at the same time, further the objectives of
punitive damages. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 450-60, 601 A.2d at 647-52.
156. Komornik, 331 Md. at 738-39, 629 A.2d at 730-31 (Chasanow, J., concurring).
"Instead of resurrecting and subtly modifying an antiquated definition of
actual malice, which gives insufficient guidance to judges and juries," Judge
Chasanow argued that the court should "establish a more meaningful 'equiv-
alent' of those words." Id. at 738, 629 A.2d at 730.
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foreseeable injury or that the defendant "willfully refused to recog-
nize that the act would cause foreseeable injury."'5 7
Judge Bell dissented from the majority opinion. " In his dissent,
the Judge advocated the totality of the circumstances approach that
he had previously suggested, in Zenobia.'59 Judge Bell opined that in
cases where there was no evidence of actual malice, looking at the
totality of the circumstances might suggest conduct that was just as
reprehensible as actual malice.'60 Based on his reasoning in Zenobia,
it is apparent that Judge Bell believed that allowing punitive damages
where there was evidence of actual malice, but not where there was
evidence of a total disregard for human life, was unreasonable.'
6'
The Judge dissented from the majority's result because he concluded




Other jurisdictions have also addressed the issue of whether
punitive damages should be available in an action against a drunk
driver and, if so, what standard should govern such an award.
Jurisdictions can be categorized by asking three questions. First, what
is the requisite state of mind for a punitive damage award? Second,
157. Id. at 739, 629 A.2d at 731. Judge Chasanow stated:
As to the required state of mind, we should simply extend Zenobia
and hold that, as a basis for punitive damages, the defendant must
have committed an intentional act, not a negligent act, and not even
a grossly negligent act. Second, we should require the defendant to
have known that the act would cause foreseeable injury or to have
willfully refused to recognize that the act would cause foreseeable
injury. This is the same basic test that we used in Zenobia, and it
should be universally applied.
Id.
158. Id. at 740, 629 A.2d at 731 (Bell, J., dissenting).
159. Id.; see Zenobia, 325 Md. at 478-86, 601 A.2d at 661-65 (Bell, J., concurring
and dissenting). Judge Bell wrote separately, in Zenobia, because he did not
agree with the actual malice standard adopted by the majority. Id. at 480, 601
A.2d at 662-63. He did agree, however, that a heightened burden of proof
was required in punitive damages cases. Id. at 480, 601 A.2d at 662. He,
therefore, concurred with the Zenobia majority's holding that clear and con-
vincing evidence would be required to support an award of punitive damages.
Id.
160. See Komornik, 331 Md. at 740, 629 A.2d at 731 (Bell, J., dissenting); see also
Zenobia, 325 Md. at 481, 601 A.2d at 663 (Bell, J., concurring and dissenting)
(discussing how the totality of the circumstances may reveal conduct "just as
heinous" as conduct motivated by actual malice).
161. See Komornik, 331 Md. at 740, 601 A.2d at 730 (Bell, J., dissenting); see also
Zenobia, 325 Md. at 481, 601 A.2d at 663 (Bell, J., concurring and dissenting).
162. Komornik, 331 Md. at 740, 601 A.2d at 730 (Bell, J., dissenting).
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how should the plaintiff prove the defendant's state of mind? Third,
what evidentiary burden must the plaintiff meet?
A. State of Mind
Fine distinctions among states of mind are very difficult, if not
impossible, to make. Nevertheless, an attempt at categorization can
be made by focusing on the defendant's knowledge of the probable
consequences of his actions. 63 As an example, compare Defendant
A with Defendant B. Defendant A knows or should know that his
actions will probably injure another. Defendant A is careless and
indifferent. He does not intend to injure, but he acts without concern
for the consequences of his actions. Defendant B, on the other hand,
is consciously aware that his actions will probably injure another.
Defendant B also does not intend to harm anyone, but he is possessed
with the knowledge that, in all likelihood, his actions will harm
someone. Defendant B voluntarily disregards this knowledge and
acts.
Despite the reprehensibility of Defendant A's state of mind,
Defendant B's state of mind is more culpable. Defendant B delib-
erately made a choice to act with full knowledge of the potential
harm whereas Defendant A merely acted with extreme indifference
to the possibility of harm. Defendants A and B, therefore, represent
two separate states of mind. Defendant A has acted with reckless
indifference, and Defendant B has acted with conscious disregard.
When distinguishing among various states of mind, investigation
of the defendant's intent to bring about the probable consequences
of his actions is sometimes as important as the defendant's knowledge
of the probable consequences of his actions. 164 To further expand
upon the example above, consider Defendant C. Defendant C not
only knows that his actions will probably harm another person, but
he actually intends for his actions to harm. Defendant C has acted
with malice, which is the most culpable state of mind. 65
163. See KEETON, supra note 3, § 34, at 208-14 (discussing degrees of care).
164. According to Professor Keeton:
The three most basic elements ... [of intent] are that (1) it is a state
of mind (2) about consequences of an act (or omission) and not about
the act itself, and (3) it extends not only to having in the mind a
purpose (or desire) to bring about given consequences but also to
having in mind a belief (or knowledge) that given consequences are
substantially certain to result from the act.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8 (1984) (emphasis in original) (footnotes
omitted). Therefore, the concept of knowledge is included in the concept of
intent. Id.
165. See Zenobia, 325 Md. at 454-60, 601 A.2d at 649-53.
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Many jurisdictions award punitive damages if the plaintiff merely
shows that a drunk driver acted with reckless indifference.166 A
substantial number of jurisdictions award punitive damages upon a
showing of conscious disregard. 67 Very few jurisdictions require the
166. See Mince v. Butters, 616 P.2d 127, 129 (Colo. 1980) ("wanton and reckless
disregard of the injured parties rights and feelings"); Seymour v. Carcia, 589
A.2d 7, 11 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991) ("reckless indifference to the rights of
others"); Gesslein v. oBritton, 206 P.2d 263, 265 (Kan. 1954) ("wrongfully,
wantonly and recklessly"); Stojkovic v. Weller, 802 S.W.2d 152, 155 (Mo.
1991) (indifference to the safety of others); Svejcara v. Whitman, 487 P.2d
167, 169 (N.M. Ct. App. 1971) (reckless or wanton disregard of the plaintiff's
rights); Taylor v. Dyer, 593 N.Y.S.2d 122, 123 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (wanton
or reckless conduct); Huff v. Chrismon, 315 S.E.2d 711, 715 (N.C. Ct. App.
1984) ("reckless indifference to the interests of others"); Harrell v. Ames, 508
P.2d 211, 214 (Ore. 1973) (wanton or reckless conduct); Focht v. Rabada, 268
A.2d 157, 159 (Pa. 1970) (reckless indifference); Merritt v. Grant, 328 S.E.2d
346, 349 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985) (reckless conduct); Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d
196, 207-08 (W. Va. 1993) ("reckless disregard of the safety of others");
Lievrouw v. Roth, 459 N.W.2d 850, 853-54 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990) ("reckless
disregard of rights or interests"); Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 193
(Wyo. 1979) ("reckless disregard of the consequences"); see also ALA. CODE
§ 6-11-20(b)(3) (1993) ("reckless or conscious disregard of the rights or safety
of others").
Courts often phrase the requisite state of mind as a combination of two
states of mind. For example, a court might require a plaintiff to prove that
the defendant acted with a "complete indifference to or conscious disregard
for the safety of others." Stojkovic, 802 S.W.2d at 155 (emphasis added).
When a court has phrased the requisite state of mind in this manner, the
author of this piece has grouped the case under the category for the least
culpable of the two given states of mind. Therefore, Stojkovic has been grouped
with those jurisdictions that require a showing of only reckless indifference.
167. See Olson v. Walker, 781 P.2d 1015, 1018 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989) ("An evil
mind can be inferred when the defendant's conduct is so outrageous . . .that
it can be assumed he . . .consciously disregarded the substantial risk of harm
created by his conduct."); Holmes v. Hollingsworth, 352 S.W.2d 96, 99 (Ark.
1961) (wanton disregard of the rights and safety of others); Taylor v. Superior
Court, 598 P.2d 854, 856 (Cal. 1979) (conscious disregard); Beal v. Braunecker,
364 S.E.2d 308, 310 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (conscious indifference), cert. denied,
185 Ga. App. 909 (1988); Hill v. Sampson, 628 So. 2d 81, 84 (La. Ct. App.
1993) (conscious indifference to the consequences); Hawkinson v. Geyer, 352
N.W.2d 784, 788 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984) (willful indifference to the rights or
safety of others); Allers v. Willis, 643 P.2d 592, 596 (Mont. 1982) ("conscious
and deliberate disregard of the interests of others") (citing Taylor v. Superior
Court, 598 P.2d 854, 894-95 (Cal. 1979)); Porter v. Funkhouser, 382 P.2d 216,
218 (Nev. 1963) ("conscious disregard of danger and probable injury to
others"); McMahon v. Chryssikos, 528 A.2d 104, 105 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1986) ("willful and wanton disregard of the rights of others"); Flockhart
v. Wyant, 467 N.W.2d 473, 478 (S.D. 1991) ("There must be facts that [show
that defendant] consciously realized that his conduct would in all probability,
as distinguished from possibility, . . . bring harm to the plaintiff."); Miskin
v. Carter, 761 P.2d 1378, 1379 (Utah 1988) ("knowing and reckless disregard
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plaintiff to show that the defendant acted with malice. l6 The other
jurisdictions may award punitive damages merely upon a showing of
implied malice. 169 "Implied malice," however, does not mean reck-
lessness, as it did during Maryland's implied malice phase. 70 Juris-
dictions that use the term "implied malice" often mean "inferred
malice," because a malicious state of mind may be inferred from
the defendant's conduct. 7'
for the rights of others") (quoting Johnson v. Rogers, 763 P.2d 771, 774 (Utah
1988)); Puent v. Dickens, 427 S.E.2d 340, 342 (Va. 1993) ("conscious disregard
of the rights of others") (quoting Baker v. Marcus, 114 S.E.2d 617, 621 (Va.
1960)); see also LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2315.4 (West 1995) ("wanton or
reckless disregard for the rights and safety of others"); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
549.20 (West Supp. 1995) ("deliberate disregard for the rights or safety of
others").
A small number of states allow a plaintiff to recover punitive damages
only upon a showing of gross negligence. See Bryant v. Alpha Entertainment
Corp., 508 So. 2d 1094, 1098-99 (Miss. 1987) (action against liquor establish-
ment which sold beer to driver of car who was underage); McElroy v. Fitts,
876 S.W.2d 190, 197 (Tex. Ct. App. 1994) (negligent entrustment case); Crider
v. Appelt, 696 S.W.2d 55, 58 (Tex. Ct. App. 1985) ("[Driving while intoxicated
was one of the elements which the jury properly should have considered ...
in determining whether defendant was grossly negligent.") (emphasis added).
However, a closer look at the courts' language indicates that something more
than gross negligence is required. See Jacmar Pac. Pizza Corp. v. Huston, 502
So. 2d 91, 92 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987) ("extreme degree of negligence as to
parallel an intentional and reprehensible act") (emphasis added); see also
Bryant, 508 So. 2d at 1099 ("Punitive damages are ordinarily recoverable only
in cases where negligence is so gross as to indicate a wanton disregard for the
safety of others.") (quoting United States Indus. v. McClure Furniture Co.,
371 So. 2d 391, 393 (Miss. 1979)); Crider, 696 S.W.2d at 58 (Trial court's
instruction stated that "intoxication, if any, does not lessen or reduce a person's
responsibility for conduct, which if he were sober, would evince a conscious
indifference to the rights, welfare or safety of the persons affected by it.").
168. See Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353 (Me. 1985); Ruther v. Tyra, 247 P.2d
964 (Okla. 1952).
169. For example, the Tuttle court stated:
[Plunitive damages are available based upoil tortious conduct only if
the defendant acted with malice .... Such malice exists where the
defendant's tortious conduct is motivated by ill will toward the plain-
tiff .... Punitive damages will also be available, however, where
deliberate conduct by the defendant, although motivated by something
other than ill will toward any particular party, is so outrageous that
malice toward a person injured as a result of that conduct can be
implied.
Tuttle, 494 A.2d at 1361 (citations omitted).
170. See supra text accompanying notes 46-92 for a discussion of Maryland's implied
malice phase.
171. Because a defendant will rarely, if ever, testify as to his state of mind at the
time of the action, every plaintiff must prove, through circumstantial evidence,
that the defendant acted with the requisite state of mind. See Cooper, supra
note 6, at 125-27. The plaintiff can prove the defendant's state of mind by
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B. Methods of Proof
In general, there are two ways in which a plaintiff can prove
the defendant's state of mind at the time of the act in question.
Most jurisdictions allow state of mind to be proven by reference to
the defendant's general conduct. 172 Fact finders in these jurisdictions
look at the totality of the circumstances to determine if the requisite
state of mind can be inferred from the defendant's conduct.
1"
Other jurisdictions follow an "aggravating circumstances" ap-
proach. 74 These jurisdictions go one step further than merely re-
quiring the jury to infer the requisite state of mind from the particular
facts of the case. Under this approach, punitive damages would not
be awarded unless a plaintiff could show that there was an "aggra-
vating circumstance" at the time of the alleged accident. 175 Intoxi-
drawing inferences from the defendant's conduct. Id.; see also Florek v.
Kennedy, 618 N.E.2d 760 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993). In Florek, the trial court denied
the plaintiff's motion to amend her complaint to include a count for punitive
damages. Id. at 761. The plaintiff argued that there was "a reasonable
likelihood that facts [would have been] proved at [t]rial to support an award
of punitive damages [because] a jury [could] infer from [the d]efendant's
conduct that he acted with malice." Id. at 762 (emphasis added).
172. See Bourgeois v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 562 So. 2d 1177, 1183 (La.
Ct. App. 1990) ("[E]vidence of a specific action on the part of the defendant
is [not] necessary. In order to prove 'wanton and reckless disregard,' the
plaintiff is required only to prove a 'general state of mind."'); Huffman v.
Love, 427 S.E.2d 357, 360 (Va. 1993) ("[D]efendant's entire conduct must be
considered in determining whether [the defendant] showed a conscious disregard
for the safety of others."); Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187, 191 (Wyo.
1979) ("It may be said as a matter of law that any one of [the facts alleged
by the plaintiff] could not support a finding of willfulness or wantonness.
Taken in toto, they would support such finding.") (emphasis added).
173. See Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 481-83, 601 A.2d 633, 661-
65 (1992) (Bell, J., concurring and dissenting) (advocating a "totality of the
circumstances" method of proof because it "may reveal conduct on the part
of a defendant that is just as heinous as the conduct motivated by . .. actual
malice").
174. See Beal v. Braunecker, 364 S.E.2d 308, 310-11 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) ("[A]
determination that [defendant's] driving under the influence of alcohol caused
[plaintiff's] injuries would support a finding that aggravating circumstances
existed."); McMahon v. Chryssikos, 528 A.2d 104, 108 (N.Y. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1986) ("[A]llowance of punitive damages where intoxication is the sole
aggravating factor ignores the necessity for willful and wanton misconduct.")
(footnote omitted); Lievrouw v. Roth, 459 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Wis. Ct. App.
1990) (holding that punitive damages could not be awarded unless the defen-
dant's conduct was outrageous) "In order for conduct to be 'outrageous' there
must be 'aggravating circumstances beyond ordinary negligence."'. Id.
175. See, e.g., Beal v. Braunecker, 364 S.E.2d 308, 310-11 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987)
(holding that unjustified intoxication, when it causes personal injuries to
another, is evidence of aggravating circumstances).
19951
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cation alone cannot serve as a basis for punitive damages.16 Many
courts that follow an "aggravating circumstances" approach have
explicitly rejected a per se approach in dealing with drunk driving
cases. 77 These courts are motivated by a desire to avoid an approach
that virtually imposes strict liability "where intoxication is involved
in an automobile accident." 
1 7
Some jurisdictions also follow a "causal connection" approach
when answering the question of how plaintiffs should prove state of
mind. These jurisdictions require plaintiffs to prove that there was
a causal connection between the defendant's intoxication and the
plaintiff's injuries. 79 The "causal connection" approach is very sim-
ilar to the "aggravating circumstances" approach.'80 Finally, a few
176. Id. at 310.
177. A per se approach allows a plaintiff to prove the defendant's state of mind
solely through evidence of the defendant's intoxication. See Taylor v. Dyer,
593 N.Y.S.2d 122, 123 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (discussing Sweeney v. Mc-
Cormick, 552 N.Y.S.2d 707, 708-09 (1990), in which the court "rejected an
award of punitive damages based solely on the fact that the driver had a blood
alcohol level of .11%").
178. See McMahon v. Chryssikos, 528 A.2d 104, 108 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1986) (criticizing the per se approach). Miskin v. Carter, 761 P.2d 1378 (Utah
1988), demonstrates the potential of imposing strict liability under a per se
approach. The plaintiff in Miskin had consumed three or four drinks on the
day of the accident. Id. at 1379. She had a friend drive her back to her place
of work where she waited four hours before driving. Id. Her blood alcohol
level was at the precise level of legal intoxication, she had no history of DUI
arrests, and she was not driving recklessly. Id. at 1380. The court decided that
this combination of factors could not possibly support an award of punitive
damages. Id.
179. See, e.g., Beal v. Braunecker, 364 S.E.2d 308, 310 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) (holding
that trial court did not err by charging the jury that should they find a causal
connection between defendant's intoxication and plaintiff's injuries, then evi-
dence of defendant's intoxication could be considered as evidence of aggravating
circumstances, which were necessary to support an award of punitive damages);
Lievrouw v. Roth, 459 N.W.2d 850, 854 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990) ("[P]unitive
damages may not be awarded . . . unless the 'outrageous' conduct has caused
or contributed to the plaintiff's damages."); see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art.
2315.4 (1995). The Louisiana Civil Code states:
[E]xemplary damages may be awarded upon proof that the injuries
on which the action is based were caused by a wanton or reckless
disregard for the rights and safety of others by a defendant whose
intoxication while operating a motor vehicle was a cause in fact of
the resulting injuries.
Id. (emphasis added).
180. Some courts consider a causal connection between the defendant's intoxication
and the plaintiff's injuries as an aggravating factor. See Beal, 364 S.E.2d at
311 (causal connection between defendant's intoxication and plaintiff's injuries
would allow jury to consider defendant's driving under the influence as evidence
of aggravating circumstances).
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jurisdictions allow plaintiffs to prove state of mind through other
methods. 8'
181. Connecticut adopted the Nast sliding-scale that was used by Maryland during
Phase II. Seymour v. Carcia, 589 A.2d 7, 11 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991) ("As the
degree of impairment by the voluntary consumption of alcohol increases, the
need for other aggravating circumstances lessens, and vice versa.") (quoting
Nast v. Lockett, 312 Md. 343, 362, 539 A.2d 1113, 1122 (1988)). In Maryland,
however, Nast was overruled by Zenobia and is no longer followed. See supra
text accompanying notes 77-92 for a discussion of Zenobia.
The sliding scale approach further clarifies how aggravating circumstances
are to be weighed, and thus is a natural progression from the aggravating
circumstances approach. A comparison of the application of the aggravating
circumstances approach with the sliding scale approach highlights the differences
between them. Under an aggravating circumstances approach, punitive damages
will not be awarded if the only proof of negligence is the defendant's blood
alcohol content, no matter how high the defendant's degree of intoxication at
the time of the alleged accident. See Beal, 364 S.E.2d at 310. Under the sliding
scale approach, however, intoxication alone could potentially serve as a basis
for punitive damages if the defendant's blood alcohol content at the time of
the alleged accident was very high. See Nast, 312 Md. at 362, 539 A.2d at
1122 ("[A] high degree of impairment calls for other aggravating circumstances,
if any at all, of a less serious nature.") (emphasis added).
Utah follows a balancing test. In Miskin v. Carter, 761 P.2d 1378 (Utah
1988), the court stated:
[I]ntoxication combined with the negligent operation of a motor vehicle
might justify an award of punitive damages in appropriate circum-
stances .... We think this determination requires a balancing of
factors. Under some circumstances, the manner in which a vehicle is
operated, when considered in light of the degree of intoxication and
the driver's past behavior patterns, may warrant punitive damages.
Id. at 1380.
Virginia has enacted a very specific statute to deal with the imposition of
punitive damages in drunk driving cases. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-44.5 (Michie
1994). Virginia's statute states that exemplary damages may be awarded when
"the defendant acted with malice toward the plaintiff or [when] the defendant's
conduct was so willful or wanton as to show a conscious disregard for the
rights of others." Id. The Virginia legislature was ingenious enough to specify
how the plaintiff should prove the defendant's state of mind. The statute states
that:
A defendant's conduct shall be deemed sufficiently willful or wanton
as to show a conscious disregard for the rights of others when the
evidence proves that (i) the defendant had a blood alcohol content of
0.15 percent or more by weight [or] volume when the incident causing
the injury or death occurred, (ii) at the time the defendant began, or
during the time he was, drinking alcohol, he knew that he was going
to operate a motor vehicle, engine or train and (iii) the defendant's
intoxication was a proximate cause of the injury to or death of the
plaintiff.
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C. Burden of Proof
The third, and final, question to be considered when discussing
other jurisdictions is what evidentiary burden must be met before
punitive damages will be awarded. Most jurisdictions merely require
a plaintiff to prove the defendant's state of mind by a preponderance
of the evidence.'8 2 Other states, however, insist that the plaintiff
prove state of mind by clear and convincing evidence.'8 3 Courts that
advocate a clear and convincing standard have increased the plain-
tiff's burden of proof because of the extreme penal nature of punitive
damages.'8 4 One jurisdiction, Colorado, even requires a plaintiff to
prove his case beyond a reasonable doubt before punitive damages
will be imposed."8 5 A small number of jurisdictions impose their own
unique evidentiary burdens on plaintiffs seeking punitive damages in
drunk driving cases.
1 6  °
V. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
Komornik v. Sparks'1 7 is troubling for two reasons. First, the
holding requires plaintiffs seeking punitive damages to prove that a
182. See, e.g., Holmes v. Hollingsworth, 352 S.W.2d 96, 98 n.2 (Ark. 1961) (quoting
with favor jury instructions given in Miller v. Blanton, 210 S.W.2d 293, 294
(Ark. 1948), which used a preponderance of the evidence standard).
183. See Olson v. Walker, 781 P.2d 1015, 1018 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989); Tuttle v.
Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1362-63 (Me. 1985); Hawkinson v. Geyer, 352
N.W.2d 784, 788 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Ruther v. Tyra, 247 P.2d 964, 968
(Okla. 1952); Lievrouw v. Roth, 459 N.W.2d 850, 853-54 (Wis. Ct. App.
1990); see also ALA. CODE § 6-11-20 (1993).
184. See Tuttle, 494 A.2d at 1355-60, 1362-63. The court increased the plaintiff's
burden of proof to the clear and convincing standard due to the criticism
associated with punitive damages, which includes the argument that punitive
damages, which are meant to punish and to deter, have no place in tort law.
Id.
185. COL. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-127 (West 1989); Mince v. Butters, 616 P.2d
127, 129 (Colo. 1980).
186. For example, South Dakota requires that:
In any claim alleging punitive or exemplary damages, before any
discovery relating thereto may be commenced and before any such
claim may be submitted to the finder of fact, the court shall find,
after a hearing and based upon clear and convincing evidence, that
there is a reasonable basis to believe that there has been willful,
wanton or malicious conduct on the part of the party claimed against.
S.D. CODIrED LAWS ANN. § 21-1-4.1 (1987). The Flockhart court explained
that a plaintiff must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, only that a
reasonable basis exists for the imposition of punitive damages. Flockhart v.
Wyant, 467 N.W.2d 473, 475 (S.D. 1991). The jury, however, may award
punitive damages even if it is convinced by only a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant was willful, wanton or malicious. Id. Iowa requires
plaintiffs to prove their case by a "preponderance of clear, convincing, and
satisfactory evidence." IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1 (West 1994).
187. 331 Md. 720, 629 A.2d 721 (1993).
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drunk driver has acted with actual malice, and second, the holding
provides little guidance as to how plaintiffs should prove the requisite
state of mind.
The Komornik court was, in all likelihood, motivated by a desire
to improve or reform the structure of punitive damages in Mary-
land. 8 Strict adherence to Zenobia's actual malice standard and the
application of a higher burden of proof help to alleviate two of the
problems associated with the implied malice standard: (1) the in-
creased number of punitive damage awards in Maryland,8 9 and (2)
the ineffectiveness of the implied malice standard in meeting the
objectives of punitive damages.190
188. Requiring plaintiffs to prove that a drunk driver acted with actual malice
furthers the reform of punitive damages that began with the court of appeals's
holding in Zenobia. See id. at 735, 629 A.2d at 728 (Chasanow, J., concurring);
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 325 Md. 420, 450-52, 455-60, 601 A.2d 633,
647-49, 650-53 (1992); see also Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, Punitive
Damage Reform-State Legislatures Can and Should Meet the Challenge Issued
by the Supreme Court of the United States in Haslip, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1365
(1993). Schwartz and Behrens discuss the desirability of reforming punitive
damage awards in light of Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Haslip,
499 U.S. 1 (1991). Id. at 1370-72. The authors discussed two "key reforms"
that the Court of Appeals of Maryland has begun to implement through
Zenobia and its progeny. The first key reform is "articulat[ing] a clear and
strong standard for juries to apply in evaluating whether a defendant's conduct
warrants punitive damages." Id. at 1374-75 ("States that allow punitive dam-
ages awards for less than intentional or conscious wrongdoing are vulnerable
to due process objections, including, for instance, states that permit punitive
damages awards for 'gross negligence."') (footnotes omitted). The second
reform discussed was "chang[ing] the burden of proof that a plaintiff must
show to establish that a defendant's conduct warrants punitive damages." Id.
at 1380-82. Zenobia increased both the state of mind and the burden of proof
required to support an award of punitive damages in Maryland. See Zenobia,
325 Md. at 460, 469, 601 A.2d at 652, 657.
For a discussion of the controversy surrounding punitive damage reform
in Maryland, see Jane Bowling, GOP Gains Unlikely to Trigger Major Shift
on Tort Reform, THE DAmY REcoRD, Nov. 15, 1994 at 1, 12. There are two
major groups, offering competing views, that advocate tort reform. The Mar-
yland Trial Lawyers Association submitted an amicus curie brief on behalf of
Komornik in which it sought to keep liability limits and restrictions out of
state courts, whereas the Punitive Damage Reform Coalition, in its brief,
wanted the court of appeals to expand Zenobia. Id.
189. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 450, 601 A.2d at 648.
190. Id. at 454-59, 601 A.2d at 649-52. The Zenobia court discussed the shortcomings
of the standards in place prior to its decision and stated: "The irrational and
inconsistent application of a punitive damages standard undermines the objec-
tive of deterrence because persons cannot predict, and thus choose to abstain
from, the type of behavior that is sanctioned by a punitive damages award."
Id. at 455, 601 A.2d at 650. Additionally, the court believed that awarding
punitive damages based on gross or even reckless conduct was inconsistent with
our society's view that punishment should be given only when conduct is
morally reprehensible. Id. at 454, 457, 629 A.2d at 650-51.
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By adopting an actual malice standard, the court of appeals
significantly lessened the possibility of recovering punitive damages
in drunk driving cases because a plaintiff would rarely, if ever, be
able to prove that a drunk driver acted with malice. Malice is defined,
in Maryland, as "evil motive, intent to injure, ill will, or fraud."' 19
These concepts are inconsistent with non-intentional behavior. Malice
implies intentional behavior, 192 and negligence is a non-intentional
tort. 191
The Komornik decision satisfies the high court's desire to curb
the proliferation of punitive damage awards by increasing the degree
of culpability necessary to support a punitive damage award.1
94
Nevertheless, the actual malice standard will be just as ineffective as
the implied malice standard in meeting the goals of punishment and
deterrence if the court does not provide further guidance as to how
the standard is to be applied in drunk driving cases. The Komornik
court should have made clear exactly how plaintiffs must prove that
a drunk driver acted with actual malice by specifying the type of
conduct that would be equated with malice. 95
191. Zenobia, 325 Md. at 460 n.20, 601 A.2d at 652 n.20.
192. For example, proving that an intoxicated driver acted with actual malice is
virtually impossible. A drunk driver is rarely coherent enough to intend any
of his actions. If the drunk driver intends anything, it is to arrive home safely,
without being arrested for driving while intoxicated. The drunk driver's wrong-
ful conduct takes place when the driver voluntarily makes the decision to drink
after having voluntarily placed himself in a position where he will have to
drive. If the driver actually intended to harm anyone, the driver would be
committing an intentional tort, such as battery. See KEETON, supra note 3, §
31.
193. Professor Keeton states:
It is helpful to an understanding of the negligence concept to distin-
guish it from intent. In negligence, the actor does not desire to bring
about the consequences which follow, nor does he know that they are
substantially certain to occur, or believe that they will. There is merely
a risk of such consequences .
Id.
194. Increasing the burden of proof will also decrease the number of successful
punitive damage claims. See Kagan, supra note 41, at 781-82 ("Procedural
barriers reduce the number of times a jury will actually consider the question
of punitive damages .... ").
195. Clarifying the method by which state of mind should be proved is important
for two reasons. First, potential plaintiffs require instruction on the manner
in which malice must be proved in non-intentional tort cases because malice
involves the element of intent. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
Second, potential defendants must be warned of behavior that will subject
them to liability. Zenobia, 331 Md. at 459 n.19, 601 A.2d at 652 n.19 (citing
2 L. SCHUTER & K. REDDEN, PUNITr DAMAGES, App. B, at 418-19 (2d ed.
1989)).
Arguably, defendants are already aware that "malicious" behavior will
possibly subject them to punitive damages. It is unclear, however, what type
[Vol. 24
There are two methods,' 96 currently used in other jurisdictions,
by which state of mind can be proven: (1) the totality of the
circumstances approach,' 97 and (2) the aggravated circumstances ap-
proach.' 98 The first method, used by many jurisdictions, is problem-
atic because it does not provide the guidance needed by potential
plaintiffs and defendants. If Maryland were to adopt this approach,
any and all circumstances could be used by a plaintiff to prove that
the defendant acted with malice. Under the totality of the circum-
stances approach, defendants cannot predict the type of conduct that
will subject them to liability, and cannot, therefore, take precautions
to avoid such conduct. Furthermore, deserving plaintiffs will not
recover due to the difficulty of proving actual malice without more
specific guidelines.
Other jurisdictions use the aggravated circumstances approach.199
This is the approach that should have been adopted by the court in
Komornik. Under the aggravated circumstances approach, only cer-
tain circumstances give rise to a punitive damage award. These
particular circumstances are specifically delineated by the court.
Adoption of an aggravated circumstances approach, therefore, would
of behavior is malicious. Perhaps Gregory Sparks would have been malicious
if he had not tried to stop his truck. See Komornik, 331 Md. at 721-22, 629
A.2d at 721-22. Perhaps his behavior would have been malicious if he had
been traveling at four times the speed limit. See id. at 726, 629 A.2d at 724
(Sparks was not traveling at an excessive speed). Finally, perhaps Sparks would
have been acting maliciously if he had driven himself to the bar where he
preceded to get drunk, knowing he was going to drive home. See id. at 723,
629 A.2d at 722 (Sparks's friend drove him to and from the bar; Sparks made
the decision to drive after he was drunk.).
196. Some states follow a per se approach, which was explicitly rejected by the
Komornik court as a matter of public policy. Komornik, 331 Md. at 730 n.6,
629 A.2d at 726 n.6; see McMahon v. Chryssikos, 528 A.2d 104 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Law Div. 1986) (adopting an aggravating circumstances approach after
comparing the per se approach and the aggravating circumstances approach).
The causal connection approach is a variation of the aggravated circumstances
approach. See supra Section IV. B. for a discussion of the causal connection
approach and the aggravating circumstances approach.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 172-73.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 174-78.
199. See Beal v. Braunecker, 364 S.E.2d 308, 310-11 (Ga. Ct. App. 1987) ("[A]
determination that [defendant's] driving under the influence of alcohol caused
[plaintiff's] injuries would support a finding that aggravating circumstances
existed."); McMahon v. Chryssikos, 528 A.2d 104, 108 (N.Y. Super. Ct. Law
Div. 1986) ("[A]llowance of punitive damages where intoxication is the sole
aggravating factor ignores the necessity for willful and wanton misconduct.")
(footnote omitted); Lievrouw v. Roth, 459 N.W.2d 850, 853 (Wis. Ct. App.
1990) (holding that punitive damages could not be awarded unless the defen-
dant's conduct was outrageous and finding that "[iun order for conduct to be
'outrageous' there must be 'aggravating circumstances beyond ordinary negli-
gence'").
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give potential defendants warning of proscribed conduct while pro-
viding potential plaintiffs with a method by which they could prove
actual malice in drunk driving cases.20
VI. CONCLUSION
Komornik v. Sparks has diminished significantly the possibility
of recovering punitive damages in drunk driving cases because proving
actual malice in non-intentional tort actions, such as drunk driving,
is difficult. An increase in the degree of culpability required to
support a punitive damage award was necessary because, under the
old, "implied malice" approach, gross negligence and recklessness
were allowable bases for recovering punitive damages. The court of
appeals's first solution, subjecting defendants to liability on the basis
of gross negligence and recklessness, however, resulted in inconsistent
application and frustrated the objectives of punitive damages. It was,
therefore, necessary to adopt the actual malice standard to further
the dual goals of punishment and deterrence. Nevertheless, these
goals will continue to be frustrated without proper guidance from
the court regarding the method by which actual malice should be
proven in drunk driving cases. Ambiguity in this area places a great
burden on the plaintiff seeking punitive damages and on the potential
defendant, who deserves to know the gravity of his actions. Adopting
an aggravating circumstances approach would provide the necessary
guidance and would relieve this burden.
Jill D. Loper
200. By using the concepts of knowledge and intent, it is possible to develop a list
of aggravating circumstances from which malice may be inferred in Maryland
drunk driving cases. For example, the existence of past drinking and driving
offenses, evidence of time spent in rehabilitation centers, and warnings not to
drive given by third parties could be used to show that the defendant had
knowledge of the dangers of drinking and driving. See Appellant's Brief at 10-
11, Komornik v. Sparks, 331 Md. 720, 629 A.2d 721 (1993) (No. 91-350).
Similarly, evidence of the defendant's blood alcohol level can be used to show
that the defendant intended to and did ignore the possible dangers. See id. at
11. Finally, a causal connection between the defendant's intoxication and the
plaintiff's injury can be used to show that the possibility of injury became a
reality. See Olson v. Walker, 781 P.2d 1015, 1018 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1989);
Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1362-63 (Me. 1985); Hawkinson v. Geyer,
352 N.W.2d 784, 788 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); Ruther v. Tyra, 247 P.2d 964,
968 (Okla. 1952); Lievrouw v. Roth, 459 N.W.2d 850, 853-54 (Wis. Ct. App.
1990); see also ALA. CODE § 6-11-20 (1993). The combination of these particular
circumstances can, therefore, be used to show that the defendant acted mali-
ciously.
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